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1.0 Introduction 
Federal agricultural conservation programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) and the Environmental Quality Improvement Program (EQIP), have invested 
billions of dollars to incentivize farmers to enhance environmental benefits. Funding for 
major USDA conservation programs was approximately 24 billion dollars during the 
period 2002-2007, and the portion allocated to working-lands programs have increased 
considerably starting in 2002 relative to land retirement programs (ERS 2009). The 
effectiveness of federal cost-share programs depends in part on whether payments 
induce a positive change in farmer behavior. In this paper, we use propensity score 
matching methods to estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in federal cost-
share programs for six conservation practices. 
Propensity score matching estimators were developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) and have been applied in various economic studies. These estimators are used to 
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), serve to reduce the 
dimension of the matching problem, and attempt to eliminate or reduce the bias induced 
by nonrandom program enrollment, which is a classic selection problem in 
nonexperimental studies. Assuming certain identifying assumptions are met, matching 
estimators are appealing because they generate counterfactuals in an intuitive manner, 
remove outliers, and impose few specification assumptions. 
Matching methods have been used for program evaluation in several contexts 
pertaining to conservation. Andam et al. (2008), for example, analyzed the effect of 
protected areas in reducing deforestation rates in Costa Rica and found that deforestation   3
rates in protected areas are 11% lower than in similar unprotected areas. Matching 
methods have been used to analyze policies aimed at reducing future urban development 
with adequate public facility ordinances (Bento et al. 2007) and reducing farmland loss 
with purchase of development rights programs (Liu and Lynch 2011). Ferraro et al. 
(2007) analyzed the impact of the US Endangered Species Act on species recovery rates 
and found significant improvements in recovery rates but only when the listing was 
combined with significant government funding.  
The previous studies focused primarily on programs or polices that protect 
against future environmental degradation. Conversely, federal cost-share programs are 
conservation programs that emphasize environmental enhancement through land 
restoration and the adoption of conservation practices. Studies examining such programs 
exist, but are limited in number. Using Natural Resource Inventory data, Lubowski et al. 
(2008) estimate a land-use change model where CRP is included as an alternative, in 
order to analyze the effect of CRP on land retirement. They find that approximately 90% 
of land enrolled under CRP constitutes additional land retirement, implying that CRP 
significantly increases the likelihood of land retirement. Lichtenberg and Smith-Ramirez 
(2011) estimate the impact on land allocation of a cost-share program in Maryland using 
a switching regression model. They find that cost-share funding induce farmers to adopt 
conservation practices they would not have used without funding; however, it also has 
the unintended consequence of inducing slippage (i.e., pasture and vegetative cover 
converted to cropland).    4
In this paper, we estimate the level of additionality from enrollment in federal 
cost-share programs for six conservation practices. We apply matching estimators to 
quantify additionality, estimated as the ATT, which equals the average increase in 
conservation effort of enrolled farmers relative to their counterfactual effort without 
funding. Our study analyzes conservation adoption and enrollment decisions using data 
from a farmer survey in Ohio. The survey includes farmer enrollment in major federal 
conservation programs, such as CRP, EQIP, and others.  The conservation practice types 
include conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfield establishment, grid sampling, grass 
waterways, and filter strips. 
We develop a new methodological approach to decompose the ATT according to 
the relative contributions of adopters and non-adopters. We define “adopters” as enrolled 
farmers who would adopt the practice even in the absence of cost-share funding, while 
“non-adopters” are enrolled farmers who would not adopt the practice without funding. 
Matching estimators are used to generate counterfactuals from the non-enrolled farmers 
to estimate the likelihood that enrolled farmers are adopters or non-adopters for each 
practice type, in addition to the relative contribution for each group to the overall ATT. 
Our empirical analysis provides three main results. First, the overall ATT for 
enrollment in cost-share programs is positive and significant for each of the six practice 
types. That is, cost-share programs induce farmers to increase the average proportion of 
conservation acreage adopted for all practices. Second, the percent additionality, defined 
as the percent increase in conservation acreage relative to the total conservation acreage 
adopted for enrolled farmers, varies dramatically between practice types. Specifically,   5
the percent additionality is highest for filter strips (92.0%), hayfields (91.0%), and cover 
crops (86.7%), while it is lowest for conservation tillage (18.0%). Finally, the new 
methodological approach that we formulate to decompose ATT into the relative 
contributions of adopters and non-adopters also provides valuable policy insights. For 
instance, the ATT for adopters is not significant for all practice types, except filter strips, 
suggesting that adopters are not significantly expanding the proportion of conservation 
acreage. Furthermore, decomposition estimates suggest that the differences in % ATT 
between practice types are mainly determined by the fraction of enrolled farmers that are 
adopters and non-adopters. Practice types that have a large fraction of non-adopters, 
such as filters trips and hayfields, exhibit larger values for % ATT. 
  The paper is structured as follows. First, we discuss the propensity score 
matching method and assumptions. Then, we formulate the decomposition of the ATT 
and derive the respective estimators for each component in the decomposition. Next, we 
describe and summarize the data from our farmer survey in Ohio. Thereafter, we provide 
the estimation results for the ATT, % ATT, and components of the decomposed ATT. 
We conclude with policy implications for conservation programs. 
 
2.0 Decomposition of the Propensity Score Estimator 
In this section, we formalize the ATT and discuss the identification assumptions needed 
for its estimation. Then, we develop the propensity score matching estimator and derive 
the decomposition of the ATT.  
    6
2.1 Propensity Score Matching Estimator 
Define an indicator variable D equal to one if farmer i enrolled in a federal conservation 
program to fund the adoption of conservation practice p, and D equals zero if a farmer 
did not enroll in a program. Further, define the potential outcome variables  1 Y  and  0 Y  for 
each farmer i and practice p. Let  1 Y  be the proportion of farm acreage that farmer i 
adopts of practice p if they enrolled in a program (D=1), and let  0 Y  be the proportion of 
farm acreage they adopted of practice p if they do not enroll (D=0), where 0 0 1 Y £ £ and
1 0 1 Y £ £ . We can only observe one of these two outcome variables for any given 
farmer. 
The treatment effect of enrolling in a conservation program on practice p is 
defined as the additional conservation effort adopted by a farmer as a result of program 
enrollment relative to not being enrolled. For farmer i and practice p, this is expressed as 
the difference between  1 Y  and  0 Y  as 1 0 Y Y t = - . Because we are interested in the average 
effect of the program across all enrolled farmers, we define the additionality for practice 
p as the expected treatment effect for the enrolled group of farmers D=1. The ATT is 
defined as: 
  [ ] [ ] [ ] 1 0 1 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 . ATT E Y Y D E Y D E Y D = - = = = - =   (1) 
The application of matching estimators requires two identification assumptions to 
be satisfied. The first assumption that justifies the use of matching estimators states that 
the potential outcome  0 Y  must be independent of program enrollment conditional on the   7
set of observable covariates X, i.e.,  0 | Y D X ^ . The vector of observed covariates X 
should affect both the decision to enroll and the potential outcomes. Rosenbaum and 
Robin (1983) demonstrated that if such a condition is satisfied, then it holds as well 
conditional on the propensity score, where the propensity score is defined as the 
probability that a farmer enrolls given X, ( ) 1| P P D X = = . The conditional 
independence assumption becomes  0 | Y D P ^ . The propensity scores can be estimated 
using discrete choice models, typically a probit or logit model. 
The second assumption states that for all farmer characteristics X, there is a 
positive probability of either enrolling or not enrolling,  ( ) 0 1| 1 P D X < = < . This 
assumption is known as the common support condition and implies that for each enrollee 
there exists a match within the group of non-enrolled farmers with a similar set of 
covariates X.  
Let H1 denote the set of enrollees and H0 the set of non-enrollees. Each enrollee 
and non-enrollee has a set of defining characteristics,  i X  and  j X , and propensity scores, 
i P and  j P, respectively, where i=1,...,I and j=1,…,J. The sets H1 and H0 only include 
those farmers on the common support. Propensity scores are obtained from a probit 
model, such that  ( ) 1| i i i P P D X = =  and  ( ) 1| j j j P P D X = = .
1 For propensity score 
kernel matching, all non-enrollees J in H0 are used as matches, where the weights 
                                                 
1 To assess the estimates of the propensity scores derived from a probit model using the covariates X, we 
use the propensity score covariate balancing test proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (1999). 
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( ) , W i j  are determined based on a kernel function, a bandwidth parameter, and the 
differences between  i P and  j P. For propensity score nearest-neighbor matching, only the 
m nearest non-enrollees are used as matches for each enrolled farmer i, where  1 m ³ , and 
distance is determined by the difference between  i P and  j P. Each of the m nearest-
neighbor matches for enrollee i receive an equal weight of  ( )
1
, W i j
m
= , while all other 
non-enrollees in the set H0 receive a weight of zero. For both matching procedures, it 
holds that  ( )
0
, 1
j H
W i j
Î
= ∑  for each farmer i. 
The propensity score matching estimator generates a counterfactual for each 
enrollee i,  0 ˆi Y , given by the weighted average 
  ( )
0
0 0 0 ˆ ˆ | , 1 , .
i i j
i i
j H
Y E Y P D W i j Y
Î
  = = =   ∑   (2) 
where  0
j Y is observed outcome for the non-enrollee j.
2 The matching estimator for the 
ATT is the average of the counterfactuals for the set of I enrollees in H1: 
  ( )
1 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ .
i i i i
i H i H i H
ATT Y Y Y Y
I I I Î Î Î
= - = - ∑ ∑ ∑   (3) 
 Using (3), the matching estimators for  [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D = and  [ ] 0 | 1 E Y D = are 
                                                 
2 The expression  0 ˆ | , 1
i
i i E Y P D   =    denotes the empirical estimate of  0 | , 1
i
i i E Y P D   =   . Refer to 
Smith and Todd (2005) for further clarification on this expression.   9
  [ ]
1
1 1
1 ˆ | 1
i
i H
E Y D Y
I Î
= = ∑   (4) 
and 
  [ ] ( )
1 0
0 0
1 ˆ | 1 , .
j
i H j H
E Y D W i j Y
I Î Î
= = ∑ ∑   (5) 
 
2.2 Decomposing the ATT for Adopters and Non-Adopters 
Define two types of farmers based on their potential outcome in the absence of funding 
0 Y : non-adopters are characterized by  0 0 Y = , and adopters are characterized by  0 0 Y > . 
The ATT in equation (1) is decomposed into two parts to determine the relative amount 
of the ATT that is attributable to adopters and non-adopters. Using conditional 
probabilities and expectations based on 0 Y , the ATT can be decomposed into: 
 
( ) [ ] [ ] { }
( ) [ ] [ ] { }
0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0| 1 | 0, 1 | 0, 1
0| 1 | 0, 1 | 0, 1 .
ATT P Y D E Y Y D E Y Y D
P Y D E Y Y D E Y Y D
= = = × = = - = =
+ > = × > = - > =
  (6) 
The first line of this equation represents the portion of the ATT that corresponds to non-
adopters. The term  [ ] 1 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D = =  is the proportion of acreage that non-adopters 
dedicate to the conservation practice with funding, while [ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D = =  is the 
expected proportion they adopt without funding.  The difference is the additional amount 
adopted by enrolled non-adopters as a result of receiving funding. Note that 
[ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D = = equals zero by definition.   10
The second line in (6) is the portion of the ATT associated with adopters. Once 
again, the difference  [ ] [ ] 1 0 0 0 | 0, 1 | 0, 1 E Y Y D E Y Y D > = - > =  equals the additional 
amount adopted by adopters as a result of receiving funding.  The ATT is the weighted 
average of these two differences according to the probabilities  ( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D = = and 
( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D > = . Given that  0 0 Y ³ , it holds that: 
  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0| 1 0| 1 1. P Y D P Y D = = + > = =   (7) 
We define the respective ATT for enrolled non-adopters and adopters as 
  [ ] [ ] 1 0 0 0 | 0, 1 | 0, 1 n ATT E Y Y D E Y Y D = = = - = =   (8) 
and 
  [ ] [ ] 1 0 0 0 | 0, 1 | 0, 1 . a ATT E Y Y D E Y Y D = > = - > =   (9) 
and the probability that an enrolled farmer is either a non-adopter or an adopter as 
 
  ( ) 0 0| 1 n P P Y D = = =   (10) 
and 
  ( ) 0 0| 1 . a P P Y D = > =   (11) 
The decomposed ATT in (6) can be expressed as: 
  . n n a a ATT P ATT P ATT = × + ×   (12)   11
This clarifies that additionality for a conservation practice depends not only on the gains 
of each type of farmer, but also on the likelihood that an enrolled farmer is either a non-
adopter or an adopter.
3 
 
3.0 Proposed Estimators for the Components of the Decomposition 
Below we derive the estimators for each of the decomposed terms. We first discuss the 
estimators for the probabilities  n P and  a P, followed by the discussion of the estimators 
for  n ATT  and  a ATT .  
 
3.1 Estimators for the Probabilities of Non-Adopters and Adopters 
We first derive the estimators for  n P and  a P (refer to (10) and (11)). We define a binary 
variable  0 B  to explain how we use matching estimators to derive the estimators for the 
probabilities. Specifically,  0 B  equals one if a farmer would adopt a practice without 
funding, and zero otherwise, i.e.,  0 1 B =  if  0 0 Y > , and  0 0 B = if  0 0 Y = . The expectation 
of  0 B  can be expressed in terms of probability that  0 Y  is greater than zero: 
  [ ] ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 | 1 1| 1 0| 1 . E B D P B D P Y D = = = = = > =   (13) 
                                                 
3 Note,  ( ) 0 0| 1 n P P Y D = = = is the probability that an enrolled farmer is a non-adopter, which is 
different from the probability that a non-adopter enrolls, which is given by  ( ) 0 1| 0 P D Y = = . The same 
is true for  a P .   12
An estimate for  [ ] 0 | 1 E B D =  is obtainable using a matching estimator; as such, the 
estimate for  ( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D > = is obtainable as well via a matching estimator. The two 
probabilities needed for the decomposition of the ATT are  ( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D > = and
( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D = = . Given an estimate for ( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D > = , we obtain an estimate for 
( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D = = using (7). 
We derive the estimators for the probabilities based on propensity score 
matching. The propensity score matching estimator generates a counterfactual for each 
enrollee i,  0 ˆi B , given by the weighted average 
  ( )
0
0 0 ˆ , ,
i j
j H
B W i j B
Î
= ∑   (14) 
where  0
j B is the  0 B  for non-enrollee j, and  [ ] 0 ˆ 0,1
i B Î . Note that  0 ˆi B  is the estimate of the 
probability that an enrolled farmer with propensity score  i P is an adopter, such that  
  ( ) 0 0 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ | , 1 0| , 1 .
i i i
i i i i B E B P D P Y P D   = = = > =     (15) 
The matching estimator for  [ ] 0 | 1 E B D =  is then the average of the counterfactuals for 
the set of I enrollees in H1: 
  [ ]
1
0 0
1 ˆ ˆ | 1 .
i
i H
E B D B
I Î
= = ∑   (16) 
Consequently, given equation (13), the estimator for  ( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D > = is:   13
  ( )
1
0 0
1 ˆ ˆ 0| 1 .
i
i H
P Y D B
I Î
> = = ∑   (17) 
The estimator for  ( ) 0 0| 1 P Y D = =  is obtained by substituting (17) into (7): 
  ( ) ( )
1 1
0 0 0
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0| 1 1 1 .
i i
i H i H
P Y D B B
I I Î Î
= = = - = - ∑ ∑   (18)   
 
3.2 Estimators for the ATT of Non-Adopters and Adopters 
In this section, we derive the estimators on  a ATT  for adopters and  n ATT for non-adopter 
that are defined in equations (8) and (9), respectively. Each ATT consists of the 
difference of two conditional expectations. The expectations are of  1 Y and  0 Y , where each 
expectation is conditioned on a value of  0 Y and D=1. We estimate each of the conditional 
expectations separately, and then take their difference to obtain the estimators for  n ATT   
and  a ATT . We first derive the estimators for the conditional expectations of  1 Y , then for 
the conditional expectations of  0 Y , and finally for each ATT. Notice that the estimators 
we derive are applicable to kernel or nearest-neighbor matching 
The estimators for  [ ] 1 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D = =  and  [ ] 1 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D > =  are given by: 
  [ ]
( )
( )
1
1
0 1
1 0
0
ˆ 1
ˆ : | 0, 1
ˆ 1
i i
i H
i
i H
B Y
Non adopter E Y Y D
B
Î
Î
-
- = = =
-
∑
∑
  (19) 
and   14
  [ ]
1
1
0 1
1 0
0
ˆ
ˆ : | 0, 1 .
ˆ
i i
i H
i
i H
B Y
Adopter E Y Y D
B
Î
Î
> = =
∑
∑
  (20) 
 
These estimators are the weighted average value of  1 Y across all I enrollees weighted by 
the estimated probability that an enrollee is either a non-adopter,  0 ˆ 1
i B - , or an adopter, 
0 ˆi B . Thus, the expectation of  1 Y for non-adopters weighs enrollees that are more likely to 
be non-adopters more heavily than those that are not. The opposite holds true for the 
conditional expectation of  1 Y for adopters.   
We now derive the estimators for  [ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D = =  and  [ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D > = , 
which are the last two terms in equations (8) and (9). The set of non-enrollees  0 H  can be 
subdivided into two groups based on the observed outcomes for each non-enrollee 0
j B : 
those that are non-adopters,  0 0
j B = , and those that are adopters  0 1
j B = . The estimator 
for the conditional expectation of  0 Y  for non-adopters,  [ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D = =  , equals zero 
by definition, so no estimator is required. The estimator for the conditional expectation 
of  0 Y  for adopters,  [ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 E Y Y D > = , equals the weighted average of  0
j Y  values for the 
set of non-enrollees that are adopters,   15
  [ ]
( )
( )
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0
,
ˆ : | 0, 1 .
,
j j
i H j H
j
i H j H
W i j B Y
Adopter E Y Y D
W i j B
Î Î
Î Î
> = =
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
  (21) 
Now that we have estimators for each of the conditional expectations found in (8) 
and (9), the estimators for the ATTs are easily obtained. The estimator for the ATT of 
non-adopters is obtained by substituting (19) into (8), where recall that 
[ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 0 E Y Y D = = = , and the estimator for the ATT of adopters is obtained by 
substituting (20) and (21) into (9): 
 
( )
( )
1
1
0 1
0
ˆ 1
ˆ :
ˆ 1
i i
i H
n
i
i H
B Y
Non Adopter ATT
B
Î
Î
-
- =
-
∑
∑
  (22) 
and 
 
( )
( )
1 0 1
1 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0
ˆ ,
ˆ : .
ˆ ,
j j i i
i H j H i H
a
i j
i H i H j H
W i j B Y B Y
Adopter ATT
B W i j B
Î Î Î
Î Î Î
   
   
    = -
   
   
   
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
  (23) 
 
4.0 Survey Background and Data Summary 
For this study, we conducted a farmer survey in southwestern Ohio within 25 counties in 
and around the Great Miami River Watershed. The study area is dominated by 
agricultural uses (83% of land area) particularly for row-crop production in corn,   16
soybeans, and wheat. Typical livestock operations include swine, beef cattle, and dairy. 
Our survey questionnaire was conducted in 2009 through the Ohio Division of the 
National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS). The sample of farmers was drawn 
from the NASS master list of farmers and a random stratified sampling was used to 
ensure a sufficient number of responses from large commercial farms. The survey was 
mailed to 2000 farmers with follow-up phone calls. There were a total of 768 survey 
respondents. However, useable responses varied by practice type depending on whether 
the farmer completed the survey information for each practice type. The survey contains 
questions on farmer socioeconomic characteristics, farm management and operation, and 
land quality characteristics.  
The survey also includes information on the acreage adopted for the following 
six conservation practices in 2009: conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfields (or 
grassland establishment), grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips.
  Conservation 
tillage leaves crop residue on fields to reduce soil erosion and runoff. Cover crops 
provide soil cover on cropland when the soil would otherwise be bare. Hayfields and 
grassland establishment retire cropland to a less intensive state to provide habitat and 
other conservation benefits. Grid sampling improves the efficiency of nutrient 
application rates to maximize crop yields, while reducing excess fertilizer that 
potentially would runoff or leach into surrounding water bodies. Grass waterways are 
located in the natural drainage areas within cropland to reduce soil erosion and gully 
formation. Filter strips are typically planted grass along stream banks to capture 
sediment, nutrients, and pesticides from runoff before they enter surrounding water   17
bodies. We categorize these six practices into two groups. First, practices for 
environmentally sensitive areas, filter strips and grass waterways, are almost exclusively 
used along stream banks or in natural drainage areas, respectively. Second, field 
practices include conservation tillage, cover crops, hayfields, and grid sampling, and 
they are often adopted as a practice for a significant portion of the cropland. 
For each practice type, the survey asks whether the farmer received cost-share 
funding from enrollment in any of the federal conservation programs. The federal 
programs included explicitly in the survey are EQIP, CRP, Conservation Reserve 
Enhancement Program (CREP), and Conservation Security Program (CSP), The Great 
Miami River Watershed has a regional water quality trading program (WQTP) 
(Newburn and Woodward, forthcoming). The WQTP was included in the survey because 
it similarly provides cost-share funding for conservation practices. An “other” option 
was included in the survey to capture any other federal or state conservation programs 
not already listed above, such as wetland and grasslands programs.   
In Table 1, we report farmer decisions on conservation practice adoption and 
program enrollment for the six practices. Farmer decisions are categorized into three 
groups: no adoption, adoption without funding, and adoption with funding. For example, 
conservation tillage has 104 (18%) farmers who did not adopt this practice, 385 (67%) 
farmers who adopted without funding, and 88 (15%) farmers who received cost-share 
support for this practice. The total number of useable observations for conservation 
tillage is 577. 
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TABLE 1 
Farmer Adoption and Enrollment by Conservation Practice Type 
              
Practice Type  No 
Adoption 
Adoption 
without 
Funding 
Adoption 
with 
Funding 
Total 
Conservation Tillage  104 (18)  385 (67)  88 (15)  577 (100) 
Cover Crops  522 (85)  68 (11)  24 (4)  614 (100) 
Hayfields  529 (88)  54 (9)  20 (3)  603 (100) 
Grid Sampling  331 (61)  159 (29)  55 (10)  545 (100) 
Grass Waterways  251 (47)  138 (26)  146 (27)  535 (100) 
Filter Strips  404 (73)  56 (10)  93 (17)  553 (100) 
All numbers are also represented as percentages within the parentheses. There were a total of 768 survey 
respondents; however, the number of useable observations varies by practice type due to missing 
information, such as farmer characteristics and acreage adopted. 
 
From Table 1, we observe that there exists large variability across practices in the 
percentage of farmers not adopting a practice. However, the percentage adopting with 
funding does not exhibit as much variation. Conservation tillage is the most adopted 
practice and has the largest number of farmers adopting without funding. Conversely, 
filter strips, cover crops, and hayfields are the least adopted overall and the least adopted 
without funding. However, unlike cover crops and hayfields, filter strips has the second 
largest number of farmers adopting with funding. Grid sampling and grass waterways 
have roughly the same number of farmers adopting without funding, however, grass 
waterways has the largest number of farmers adopting with funding.  
  For our empirical analysis, the treatment group for a given practice type is 
comprised of farmers who enrolled in any cost-share program for this practice. The 
control group is comprised of farmers who did not enroll in any program. Table 2   19
summarizes farmer enrollment in the conservation cost-share programs. CRP was the 
dominant funding source for enrolled farmers who adopted grass waterways and 
hayfields. However, there was not a single dominant funding source for enrolled farmers 
who adopted conservation tillage, filter strips, cover crops, or grid sampling.
4 Enrollment 
in the Great Miami WQTP represents only a small fraction of overall enrollment in 
Table 2. The CSP program rules are known to allow cost-share funding for both new and 
existing conservation practices. As such, CSP funds may be directed towards subsidizing 
conservation effort that is not additional. As a robustness check, in the results section we 
estimate additionality for all programs, all programs excluding CSP, and only CSP to 
test whether there are significant differences between CSP and other programs on the 
additionality estimates. 
TABLE 2 
Farmers Enrolled in Cost-Share Programs by Conservation Practice 
Practice Type  EQIP  CSP  CRP  CREP  WQTP  OTHER 
Conservation Tillage  16  36  25  1  5  11 
Cover Crops  6  3  2  0  6  4 
Hayfields  1  1  14  2  0  1 
Grid Sampling  13  21  3  1  2  6 
Grass Waterways  10  15  89  6  3  15 
Filter Strips  8  15  48  18  1  8 
 
                                                 
4 Some farmers reported receiving funding from more than one program for the same practice. For 
example, a farmer could receive EQIP funding for a filter strip on one field, and CRP funding for a filter 
strip on another field.   20
Table 3 summarizes the average proportion of acreage, relative to the total 
acreage of the property, a farmer adopts in a conservation practice.
5 Summarized values 
are provided for enrolled and non-enrolled farmers, as well as across all of these farmers. 
The set of non-enrolled farmers includes both farmers who adopted a practice without 
funding and farmers who did not adopt the practice (Table 1). Thus, for practices where 
the number of farmers who did not adopt is large, the average proportion for non-
enrolled farmers is weighed heavily by zero values. For example, the average proportion 
of hayfield acreage for non-enrolled farmers is small (0.014) due to the large number of 
farmers that did not adopt the practice. The average proportions for environmentally 
sensitive practices are small as well. The reason is that filter strips and grass waterways, 
by design, are solely focused along stream banks and in natural drainage areas rather 
than across the entire field, and thus, represent a smaller proportion of total farm 
acreage. Overall, the average proportions for enrolled farmers were largest for 
conservation tillage and grid sampling, followed by hayfields and cover crops. For 
environmentally sensitive practices, the average proportions for enrolled farmers were 
roughly the same. 
 
                                                 
5 Farmers that reported a proportion of adopted conservation acreage greater than 1 for field practices and 
greater than 0.15 for environmentally sensitive practices were dropped because they were considered 
inaccurate survey responses.    21
TABLE 3 
Average Proportion of Conservation Adoption on Farm Acreage by Practice Type 
           
Practice Type 
Non-
Enrolled 
Farmers 
Enrolled 
Farmers 
All 
Farmers 
Conservation Tillage  0.520  0.747  0.554 
Cover Crops  0.020  0.239  0.029 
Hayfields  0.014  0.265  0.022 
Grid Sampling  0.194  0.718  0.247 
Grass Waterways  0.006  0.016  0.009 
Filter Strips  0.001  0.011  0.002 
 
Prior to estimating the ATT, the covariates X that are included in the first-stage 
estimation of the propensity scores must be determined. The covariates X should consist 
of those variables that are believed to affect both the outcomes and enrollment decisions 
(Smith and Todd, 2005). Propensity scores are estimated using a probit model, where the 
dependent variable is the enrollment variable D. The propensity scores were assessed for 
all practices.
6 Table 4 provides the definition of each of the covariates used in the 
estimation, as well as the summary statistics. Because each practice has a different 
number of total observations, we only provide the results for grid sampling. The average 
values on the covariates do not vary significantly between practice types. 
 
                                                 
6 Refer to section 2.1 for information on the test used to assess the propensity scores.   22
TABLE 4 
Summary Statistics on Explanatory Variables for Grid Sampling 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev 
Farm 
Revenue  =1 if farm revenue exceeded $250,000 in 2009  0.275  0.447 
Farm 
Horizon 
=1 if farm will be operated by family within the 
next 5 years  0.877  0.329 
Age  age  56.736  11.583 
Experience  years of farming experience  31.914  12.913 
Education  =1 if education exceeds high school  0.437  0.496 
Soil type 
=1 if dominant soil texture is clay  0.754  0.431 
=1 if dominant soil texture is loam or sandy  0.246  0.431 
Household 
Income 
=1 if 0% - 10% of household income comes from 
farming  0.209  0.407 
=1 if 10% - 50% of household income comes 
from farming  0.328  0.470 
=1 if more than 50% of household income comes 
from farming  0.462  0.499 
Acres 
Rented  proportion of farm acreage rented in 2009  0.425  0.365 
Acres in 
Grain 
proportion of farm acreage devoted to grain 
crops in 2009  0.805  0.281 
Slope 
proportion of farm acreage with slope 0%-2%  0.559  0.384 
proportion of farm acreage with slope 2%-6%  0.384  0.362 
proportion of farm acreage greater than 6% slope  0.058  0.138 
Farm Size  natural log of total farm acreage operated in 2009  5.769  1.073 
Streams  =1 if a river or stream borders or runs through 
the property  0.583  0.493 
Livestock  =1 if managed livestock in 2009  0.486  0.500 
 
 
The estimated probit coefficients for grid sampling are provided in Table 5. The 
variables that are significant at the 99% level are education, acres in grain, and high 
slope.  
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TABLE 5 
Estimated Coefficients from Probit Model to Compute Propensity Scores for Cost-Share 
Enrollment in Grid Sampling  
  
Variable  Estimated 
Coeff.  Std. Error 
Farm Revenue  0.182  0.230 
Farm Horizon  0.714*  0.385 
Age  0.009  0.011 
Experience  -0.009  0.010 
Education  0.580***  0.170 
Soil Type: Not Clay  0.121  0.189 
Medium Income  0.255  0.259 
High Income  0.113  0.278 
Acres Rented  -0.124  0.274 
Acres in Grain  1.844***  0.712 
Medium Slope  0.370  0.235 
High Slope  1.526***  0.560 
Farm Size  0.200  0.142 
Streams  -0.160  0.169 
Livestock  0.053  0.179 
Constant  -5.660***  1.184 
Log Likelihood  -151.404    
Note: Statistical  significance: 99% (***), 95% (**), 90%(*). Estimates of the propensity scores  were 
assessed using the test proposed by Deheija and Wahaba (1999). All practices passed the test. For grid 
sampling, both age and experience were needed in the probit specification to past the test. For all other 
practices, only age was needed and experience was not included. 
 
 
 
 
5.0 Estimation Results of Additionality and the Decomposed Effects 
In this section we provide the estimation results on additionality and the decomposed 
components of the ATT for the six conservation practices.
7 Table 6 provides the 
                                                 
7 We tested for significant differences in % ATT given all programs except CSP and only CSP for 
conservation tillage, grid sampling, grass waterways, and filter strips. We did not test this difference for   24
estimates for the overall ATT, % ATT, and each component of the decomposed ATT for 
all practices.  The estimation is performed using propensity score matching with the 
Epanechnikov kernel algorithm, where the common support requirement is enforced and 
the kernel bandwidth is 0.02.
8, 9 The standard errors and 95% confidence intervals (CI) 
were generated using a bootstrap procedure based on 1,000 simulations.
 10 
 
TABLE 6 
 Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and Decomposed Effects for Non-Adopters and 
Adopters using Propensity Score Kernel Matching 
  
Conservation Tillage  Estimate Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.1348  0.0321  0.0756  0.2006 
% ATT  18.0  3.8  10.7  25.4 
Pn  0.1242  0.0206  0.0883  0.1684 
Pa  0.8758  0.0206  0.8316  0.9117 
ATTn  0.6976  0.0364  0.6374  0.7783 
ATTa  0.0549  0.0320  -0.0041  0.1170 
Matched enrolled farmers = 87, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 489 
         
                                                                                                                                                
cover crops and hayfields because enrollment numbers in CSP are too small (refer to Table 2). We found 
that % ATT for these four practices is higher when considering only CSP enrollees than for all programs 
except CSP. However, the differences were not statistically different from zero. As such, additionality 
estimates in this section are for all programs, including CSP. 
8 We impose the common support trimming option in Stata using 2% trimming. Refer to Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003).  
9 Matching quality was assessed using a two-sample t-test to check for significant differences in covariate 
means across matched groups. All covariates were balanced successfully for all practices. Refer to 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for information on the covariate balancing test. 
10 The bootstrapping procedure used 1,000 random draws from the data set of farmers, with replacement 
and using the same number of farmers in each draw equal to the number in the original data set. The 95% 
bootstrapped CI consists of the 26
th and 975
th largest parameter estimates.   25
              
Cover Crops  Estimate Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.2072  0.0423  0.1343  0.2971 
% ATT  86.7  7.7  66.6  95.4 
Pn  0.8639  0.0370  0.7745  0.9250 
Pa  0.1361  0.0370  0.0750  0.2255 
ATTn  0.2392  0.0408  0.1691  0.3260 
ATTa  0.0038  0.0939  -0.2048  0.1637 
Matched enrolled farmers = 24, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 590 
         
              
Hayfields  Estimate Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.2033  0.0626  0.0613  0.3163 
% ATT  91.0  8.4  67.7  96.3 
Pn  0.8914  0.0344  0.7997  0.9347 
Pa  0.1086  0.0344  0.0653  0.2003 
ATTn  0.2182  0.0617  0.0847  0.3336 
ATTa  0.0814  0.1083  -0.1902  0.2482 
Matched enrolled farmers = 18, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 583 
         
              
Grid Sampling  Estimate Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.4788  0.0557  0.3352  0.5535 
% ATT  65.8  5.7  50.7  72.1 
Pn  0.5775  0.0478  0.4564  0.6492 
Pa  0.4225  0.0478  0.3508  0.5436 
ATTn  0.7229  0.0441  0.6263  0.8019 
ATTa  0.1451  0.0706  -0.0263  0.2472 
Matched enrolled farmers = 54, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 490   26
              
Grass Waterways  Estimate Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.0097  0.0018  0.0059  0.0131 
% ATT  61.6  7.4  44.8  73.3 
Pn  0.5652  0.0412  0.4939  0.6493 
Pa  0.4348  0.0412  0.3507  0.5061 
ATTn  0.0158  0.0016  0.0130  0.0192 
ATTa  0.0018  0.0027  -0.0041  0.0071 
Matched enrolled farmers = 144, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 389 
         
              
Filter Strips  Estimate Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.0098  0.0019  0.0065  0.0139 
% ATT  92.0  3.5  83.7  96.9 
Pn  0.8373  0.0346  0.7579  0.8900 
Pa  0.1627  0.0346  0.1100  0.2421 
ATTn  0.0107  0.0019  0.0073  0.0149 
ATTa  0.0050  0.0030  0.00009  0.0117 
Matched enrolled farmers = 92, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 460 
         
 
The overall ATT in Table 6 is estimated based on equation (3). The % ATT in Table 6 is 
the ratio of the overall ATT in equation (3) and  [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D =  in equation (4) 
 
[ ] 1
% 100
| 1
ATT
ATT
E Y D
= ×
=
  (24) 
Note that the overall ATT is equal to  [ ] [ ] 1 0 | 1 | 1 E Y D E Y D = - = , which therefore has an 
upper bound of  [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D = . The % ATT can be interpreted as the percentage increase 
in the proportion of conservation acreage normalized by the total proportion of   27
conservation acreage adopted, conditional on enrollment. The % ATT is thus equal to 
the percent additionality. The formulation of the ATT decomposition is given by 
equation (12). The estimated average probabilities  a P and  n P that for the set of enrolled 
farmers that are adopters or non-adopters are calculated based on equations (17) and (18)
, respectively. Meanwhile, the values  n ATT  and  a ATT  for non-adopters and adopters are 
calculated using equations (22) and (23), respectively. 
  The overall ATT is positive and statistically significant for all six practices 
(Table 6). Specifically, the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals do not contain zero 
for any of the six practice types. This suggests that enrollment in cost-share programs 
achieves a significantly positive level of additionality for each practice type. The ATT 
values are higher for the field practice types than those of environmentally sensitive 
practices. The reason is that filter strips and grass waterways, by design, are solely 
focused along stream banks and in natural drainage areas rather than across the entire 
field, and thus, represent a smaller proportion of total farm acreage. Remember that the 
proportion of conservation acreage adopted by enrolled farmers is less than 0.02 for both 
filter strips and grass waterways (Table 3). 
To compare the level of additionality between practice types, we use the % ATT 
in equation (24) that normalizes the overall ATT by the upper bound on the proportion 
of conservation acreage adopted by enrolled farmers,  [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D = .  The largest % ATT 
is found for filter strips, hayfields, and cover crops with 92.0%, 91.0%, and 86.7%, 
respectively (Table 5). Moderate percent additionality was found for grid sampling and   28
grass waterways with % ATT at 65.8% and 61.6%. Conservation tillage had the lowest 
percent additionality at only 18.0%. In sum, this suggests that while cost-share funding 
from enrollment in conservation programs achieve a positive ATT for all practice types, 
certain practice types achieve higher percent additionality than others.   
To test whether the % ATT values are statistically different across practice types, 
we construct bootstrapped confidence intervals of the difference in % ATT for all pair-
wise combinations of practice types (Table 7). For example, the difference in % ATT 
between cover crops relative to conservation tillage has a 95% bootstrapped confidence 
interval spanning lower and upper bounds of 48.7 % to 81.3%, respectively. This 
indicates that cover crops have a significantly higher % ATT than conservation tillage. 
Meanwhile, the difference in % ATT between cover crops and hayfields is not 
statistically significant from zero because the bootstrapped confidence interval spans 
from -23.1% to 24.4%.  When comparing the two environmentally sensitive practices, 
filter strips has a statistically larger % ATT than grass waterways.  
We performed robustness checks on the estimates of the ATT, % ATT, and the 
decomposed effects using propensity score matching with the nearest-neighbor 
algorithm based on four neighbors (m=4), with replacement. The results are provided in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix A.1. The nearest-neighbor algorithm results in larger standard 
errors, i.e., wider bootstrapped confidence intervals, than the kernel algorithm. This 
causes the  a ATT  for filter strips to not be statistically different from zero. The algorithm 
also leads to a negative  a ATT  for hayfields, however, it is not statistically different from 
zero. Nonetheless, this reduces the value of the % ATT for hayfields considerably, from   29
91% to 83%. Other than these differences, parameter estimates for all practices are quite 
similar across the two algorithms. We generated as well the bootstrapped confidence 
intervals of the difference in % ATT for all pair-wise combinations, as in Table 7, using 
the nearest-neighbor algorithm. The statistical significance of the differences in % ATT 
remained the same based on the alternative matching algorithm. Consequently, the 
similarity in the parameter estimates and the differences in % ATT demonstrate the 
robustness of the results to different matching algorithms. 
 
TABLE 7  
Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Intervals for Pair-wise Differences in % ATT using Propensity 
Score Kernel Matching (Row minus Column) 
                             
        
   Conservation 
Tillage    
Cover 
Crops     Hayfields     Grid 
Sampling     Grass 
Waterways   Filter Strips 
Conservation 
Tillage                           
                                 Cover Crops   [48.7,  81.3]                              
                               
  Hayfields    [48.5,  82.0]   [-23.1, 24.4]                    
                                   Grid 
Sampling    [30.4,  56.8]   [-40.4, -3.8]   [-41.2, -1.6]              
                               
  Grass 
Waterways    [25.4,  57.7]   [-46.0  -1.8]   [-46.7, -1.7]   [-16.3, 20.7]        
                                 Filter Strips   [62.6,  82.5]    [-25.4,  8.1]    [-26.1,  8.2]    [17.4  42.7]    [15.6, 48.7]         
                                       30
The components of the decomposed ATT help to explain the relative 
contributions of non-adopters and adopters to the overall ATT, which, in turn, explains 
the differences in % ATT between practice types. Table 6 highlights that a ATT  is less 
than  n ATT  for all practice types as expected. Interestingly,  a ATT  is positive but not 
statistically different from zero for all practices, except for filter strips. This implies that 
adopters are not significantly expanding the proportion of conservation acreage. Hence, 
practices for which a large fraction of enrolled farmers are adopters (i.e.,  a P is large) 
typically have a lower % ATT. Consider conservation tillage where  n ATT  is 0.70, while 
a ATT  is only 0.07. The fraction of enrolled farmers for conservation tillage that are 
adopters,  0.87 a P = , is much larger than that of non-adopters,  0.13 n P = . Consequently, 
because a large fraction of enrolled farmers are adopters, the overall ATT is small 
relative to the total amount of conservation coverage, and thus, the % ATT is relatively 
low for conservation tillage. 
Practices where  n P is considerably larger than   a P have higher % ATT values. 
When comparing the environmentally sensitive practice types, the fraction of enrolled 
farmers that are non-adopters for filter strips is  0.84 n P = , while for grass waterways 
0.57 n P =  (Table 6). As such, the % ATT is larger for filters strips (92.0%) than for 
grass waterways (61.6%). Similar results are found when comparing field practices. 
Cover crops and hayfields have larger  n P values than grid sampling and conservation 
tillage. As such, the % ATT values for cover crops and hayfields, 86.7%, and 91.0%,   31
respectively, exceed that of grid sampling and conservation tillage, 65.8% and 18.0%, 
respectively. The % ATT for conservation tillage is considerably smaller than for the 
other five practices because it has the smallest value for  n P. Notice that the % ATT 
depends as well on the relative magnitude of  a ATT  to  n ATT . The closer to one is the 
ratio of  a ATT  to  n ATT , the smaller is the effect of  n P and  a P on the % ATT. 
Nonetheless, since the ratio of  a ATT  to  n ATT  ranges from 0.08 for conservation tillage 
to 0.47 for filter strips, the probabilities  n P and  a P  affect considerably the % ATT. 
The heterogeneity in  a P and  n P, and consequently in % ATT, across practices 
may presumably be related to differences in the private net benefits provided by each 
conservation practice. This follows from the assumption that higher onsite benefits of a 
practice should increase the likelihood that a farmer is an adopter even without cost-
share payment. Conservation tillage, for example, provides a modest or negligible 
reduction in yields to most farmers without requiring significantly greater expenditures. 
This provides positive private net benefits and results in a large  a P  for conservation 
tillage. Filter strips, cover crops, and hayfields, on the other hand, reduce the amount of 
land in production without providing onsite benefits, such as an increase in yield or 
nutrient retention. As a consequence, private net benefits are expected to be negative, 
and the majority of enrolled farmers would not adopt such practices without financial 
support (i.e., large  n P ). Grass waterways and grid sampling also impose opportunity 
costs on the farmer, but they provide greater onsite benefits than filter strips, cover 
crops, and hayfields. Grass waterways reduce the amount of working land, but retain   32
nutrients that would otherwise be depleted, while grid sampling requires significant 
investments in management and technological resources, but is expected to considerably 
increase farmer yields. These practices are thus expected to have a larger proportion of 
enrolled adopters than filter strips, cover crops, and hayfields. 
If we compare the two environmentally sensitive practices, filter strips and grass 
waterways, which provide the same offsite benefits (i.e., a reduction in nutrient runoff 
into streams), we see that filter strips has a statistically greater % ATT than grass 
waterways. Presumably, this is due to the fact that grass waterways provide larger 
private net benefits than filter strips due to their larger onsite benefits. This leads to a 
larger fraction of enrolled adopters for grass waterways than for filters strips, and a 
reduction in the % ATT of grass waterways. Our results on % ATT thus coincide with 
what we would expect to observe based on private net benefits: larger additionality (i.e., 
% ATT) for practices with lower private net benefits, and lower additionality for 
practices with larger private net benefits. 
It should be acknowledged that if there exist unobserved covariates that influence 
both enrollment and the potential outcomes, then the estimated ATT may be biased (Guo 
and Fraser 2010). Rosenbaum (2002) developed a method that determines the extent to 
which a matching estimator is sensitive to unobserved selection bias by altering the 
estimated odds (i.e., propensity scores) of program enrollment and quantifying how 
much these alterations affect the estimated ATT. A study that is not sensitive to 
unobserved bias would find that the ATT is robust to changes in the propensity scores 
(Guo and Fraser 2010). Results from the sensitivity analysis are provided in Appendix   33
A.5. Overall, results suggest that ATT estimates for all practices, except for conservation 
tillage, show moderate to high levels of robustness to unobserved bias.  
  
6.0 Conclusions 
Federal cost-share funding for the adoption of conservation practices on working lands 
have increased considerably starting in 2002. The efficiency of cost-share programs 
depends in part on the degree to which they provide additional conservation effort. In 
this paper, we use propensity score matching to estimate the level of additionality from 
enrollment in federal cost-share programs for six conservation practices.  Our results 
indicate that the enrollment achieves positive and significant levels of additionality for 
each of the six practice types. That being said, the percent additionality varies 
dramatically between practice types. Specifically, the percent additionality is highest for 
filter strips (92.0%), hayfields (91.0%), and cover crops (86.7%), while it is lowest for 
conservation tillage (18.0%). 
Valuable policy insights are provided by the new methodological approach that 
decomposes ATT into the relative contributions of adopters and non-adopters. Both 
types of farmers can provide additionality as long as each adopts more conservation 
acreage than they would have in the absence of payment. We found, however, that the 
ATT for adopters is not statistically significant for all practice types, except filter strips, 
suggesting that adopters are not contributing to the expansion of conservation acreage. 
Furthermore, decomposition estimates suggest that the differences in % ATT between 
practice types are mainly determined by the fraction of enrolled farmers that are adopters   34
and non-adopters. Practice types that have a large fraction of non-adopters, such as 
filters trips and hayfields, exhibit larger values for % ATT. This methodological 
approach to decompose ATT is broadly applicable for program evaluation in other 
contexts where program participants can be categorized into two distinct groups. 
The practice of offering payment incentives to farmers or landowners to improve 
environmental stewardship is growing in popularity. For example, emerging markets for 
ecosystem services are being developed that offer payments to landowners to improve 
carbon sequestration and water quality via land restoration and the adoption of 
agricultural BMPs. In such programs, additionality is a major concern because it is a 
principal measurement of program effectiveness. As we move towards a greater 
implementation of incentive-based programs to address environmental concerns, 
analysis of existing programs is crucial to determining whether such programs lead to 
increased conservation effort. In this paper, we apply matching estimators to measure 
additionality for federal incentive-based programs, as well as develop a methodology 
that decomposes additionality into the relative contributions of adopters and non-
adopters. This provides greater insight into the effect of incentive-based programs on 
different types of program participants and quantifies the gains achieved by each. 
 
Appendix 
In this appendix, we present the results for propensity score matching with the nearest-
neighbor algorithm and provide validation of the estimators we propose for each 
component of the decomposition. First, we provide the results for propensity score   35
matching with the nearest-neighbor algorithm. Then, we validate the estimators for the 
conditional expectation of  1 Y, equations (19) and (20), and follow with the validation for 
the estimators of the conditional expectation of  0 Y , equation (21). Finally, we provide 
validations for the estimators of the respective ATT for non-adopters and adopters, 
equations (22) and (23), respectively. The estimators for the probabilities, given by (17) 
and (18), are used in the validation process. The last section discusses the sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
A.1 Propensity Score Nearest-Neighbor Matching Results 
In this section, we provide the results for the ATT, % ATT, and the decomposed effects 
based on propensity score nearest-neighbor matching. Results were discussed in section 
5. Table A.1 below provides the results. 
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TABLE A.1 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated and Decomposed Effects for Non-Adopters and 
Adopters using Propensity Score Nearest-Neighbor Matching (m=4) with Replacement 
              
Conservation Tillage  Estimate  Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.1489  0.0459  0.0491  0.2261 
% ATT  19.9  5.8  6.4  28.9 
Pn  0.1293  0.0383  0.0540  0.2033 
Pa  0.8707  0.0383  0.7967  0.9460 
ATTn  0.7035  0.0756  0.5496  0.8492 
ATTa  0.0666  0.0422  -0.0243  0.1358 
Matched enrolled farmers = 87, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 226 
         
              
Cover Crops  Estimate  Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.1972  0.0458  0.1162  0.3003 
% ATT  82.5  11.1  57.8  98.9 
Pn  0.8438  0.0741  0.6905  0.9762 
Pa  0.1563  0.0741  0.0238  0.3095 
ATTn  0.2293  0.0441  0.1684  0.3391 
ATTa  0.0239  0.1679  -0.3748  0.3279 
Matched enrolled farmers = 24, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 76 
         
              
Hayfields  Estimate  Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.1861  0.0686  0.0434  0.3127 
% ATT  83.4  18.6  31.9  100.0 
Pn  0.8750  0.0821  0.6786  1.0000 
Pa  0.1250  0.0821  0.0000  0.3214 
ATTn  0.2209  0.0656  0.0797  0.3446 
ATTa  -0.0575  0.2410  -0.5976  0.4619 
Matched enrolled farmers = 18, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 64 
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Grid Sampling  Estimate  Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.4846  0.0747  0.2732  0.5633 
% ATT  66.6  9.1  40.7  74.8 
Pn  0.5926  0.0752  0.3750  0.6568 
Pa  0.4074  0.0752  0.3432  0.6250 
ATTn  0.7207  0.0678  0.5267  0.7883 
ATTa  0.1412  0.1525  -0.2893  0.3132 
Matched enrolled farmers = 54, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 144 
              
Grass Waterways  Estimate  Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.0100  0.0021  0.0051  0.0136 
% ATT  63.6  10.2  37.8  77.1 
Pn  0.5677  0.0558  0.4650  0.6757 
Pa  0.4323  0.0558  0.3243  0.5350 
ATTn  0.0159  0.0019  0.0125  0.0200 
ATTa  0.0023  0.0037  -0.0068  0.0082 
Matched enrolled farmers = 144, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 246 
         
              
Filter Strips  Estimate  Std. Error  95% Bootsrapped CI 
ATT  0.0099  0.0019  0.0062  0.0140 
% ATT  93.4  5.6  76.7  98.2 
Pn  0.8478  0.0472  0.7321  0.9128 
Pa  0.1522  0.0472  0.0872  0.2679 
ATTn  0.0110  0.0020  0.0072  0.0150 
ATTa  0.0040  0.0050  -0.0040  0.0165 
Matched enrolled farmers = 92, Matched non-enrolled farmers = 202 
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A.2 Validation of the Estimators for the Conditional Expectation of Y1 for Non-Adopters 
and Adopters 
To demonstrate the validity of the proposed estimators for the conditional expectations 
of  1 Y, we rely on the following decomposition of  [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D = : 
  [ ] ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]
1 0 1 0
0 1 0
| 1 0| 1 | 0, 1
0| 1 | 0, 1
E Y D P Y D E Y Y D
P Y D E Y Y D
= = = = × = =
+ > = × > =
  (25) 
When we substitute the estimators (17), (18), (19), and (20) into (25), we should obtain 
the matching estimator for [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D =  given by (4). Substituting these estimators into 
(25), we obtain: 
  [ ] ( )
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 0
0 0
ˆ ˆ 1
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ | 1 1
ˆ ˆ 1
i i i i
i H i H i i
n
i i i H i H
i H i H
B Y B Y
E Y D B B
I I B B
Î Î
Î Î
Î Î
   
-             = = - × + ×             -    
   
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
  (26) 
which, after canceling terms and noting that  ( )
1 1
0 0 ˆ ˆ 1 1
i i
i H i H
B B
Î Î
- + = ∑ ∑ , yields: 
  [ ]
1
1 1
1 ˆ | 1
i
i H
E Y D Y
I Î
= = ∑   (27) 
Thus, our proposed estimators for each of the decomposed terms yield the standard 
matching estimator for  [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D =  given by (4). 
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A.3 Validation of the Estimators for the Conditional Expectation of Y0 for Non-Adopters 
and Adopters 
The matching estimator for  [ ] 0 | 1 E Y D =  is given by equation (5). Substituting equation 
(2) into (5), we obtain 
  [ ] ( )
1 0
0 0
1 ˆ | 1 , .
j
i H j H
E Y D W i j Y
I Î Î
= = ∑ ∑   (28) 
Noting that  ( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 , , 1 ,
j j j j j
j H j H j H
W i j Y W i j B Y W i j B Y
Î Î Î
= - + ∑ ∑ ∑ and 
( )( )
0
0 0 , 1 0
j j
j H
W i j B Y
Î
- = ∑ , we have that 
  ( ) ( )
0 0
0 0 0 , , .
j j j
j H j H
W i j Y W i j B Y
Î Î
= ∑ ∑   (29) 
Substituting equation (29) into (28), the standard matching estimator can now be 
expressed as 
  [ ] ( )
1 0
0 0 0
1 ˆ | 1 , .
j j
i H j H
E Y D W i j B Y
I Î Î
= = ∑ ∑   (30) 
To demonstrate the validity of the proposed estimators for the conditional expectations 
of  0 Y , we rely on the decomposition of  [ ] 0 | 1 E Y D =  given by 
  [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 0 0 0 | 1 0| 1 | 0, 1 , E Y D P Y D E Y Y D = = > = > =   (31)    40
where  [ ] 0 0 | 0, 1 0 E Y Y D = = = and drops out of the formulation. When we substitute the 
estimators (17) and (21) into (31), we should obtain the matching estimator for
[ ] 0 | 1 E Y D =  given by (30). Substituting these estimators into (31), we obtain 
  [ ]
( )
( )
( )
1 0
1 1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0 0 0
0
,
1 1 ˆ ˆ | 1 , ,
,
j j
i H j H i j j
j i H i H j H
i H j H
W i j B Y
E Y D B W i j B Y
I I W i j B
Î Î
Î Î Î
Î Î
 
      = = × =      
 
 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
  (32)   
where  0 ˆi B  is given by equation (14). Thus, our proposed estimators for each of the 
decomposed terms yield the standard matching estimator for  [ ] 0 | 1 E Y D =  given by (30). 
 
A.4 Validation of the Estimators for the ATTs of Non-Adopters and Adopters 
To demonstrate the validity of the proposed estimators for the ATT, we begin with the 
decomposition of the ATT given by (12). When we substitute in the estimators, (17), 
(18), (22), and (23) into (12), we should obtain the matching estimator for the ATT 
given by (3). Substituting the estimators into (12), we obtain: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1
1 0 1
1
1 1 0
0 1
0
0
0 0 0 1
0
0 0
ˆ 1
1 ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ 1
ˆ ,
1 ˆ ,
ˆ ,
i i
i H i
i i H
i H
j j i i
i H j H i H i
n
i j i H
i H i H j H
B Y
ATT B
I B
W i j B Y B Y
B
I B W i j B
Î
Î
Î
Î Î Î
Î
Î Î Î
 
-       = - ×       -  
 
     
              + × -                        
∑
∑
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
  (33) 
which can be rewritten as:   41
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
1
1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
0
ˆ ˆ 1
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
ˆ ˆ 1
,
1 ˆ
,
i i i i
i H i H i i
i i i H i H
i H i H
j j
i H j H i
j i H
i H j H
B Y B Y
ATT B B
I I B B
W i j B Y
B
I W i j B
Î Î
Î Î
Î Î
Î Î
Î
Î Î
     
-                 = - × + ×                 -            
  
        - ×      
 
 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑
.




 
   
  (34) 
The first term in equation (34) equals the matching estimator for  [ ] 1 | 1 E Y D =  given by 
(26), and the second term equals the matching estimator for  [ ] 0 | 1 E Y D =  given by (32). 
Thus, equation (34) yields: 
  [ ] [ ]
1 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ | 1 | 1 ,
i i
i H i H
ATT E Y D E Y D Y Y
I I Î Î
= = - = = - ∑ ∑   (35) 
which equals the standard matching estimator for the ATT given by equation (3).  
 
A.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Rosenbaum (2002) developed several methods for testing sensitivity to hidden bias. We 
use the Wilxocon singed rank statistic based on nearest-neighbor propensity score 
matching using only matched pairs (m=1).  Using this approach, we determine the upper 
bounds on the significance level (critical p-values) for the ATT given different values of 
G. If ATT remains significant for values of Ggreater than 1.75, we can then conclude   42
that estimates are at least moderately robust to potential hidden bias.
11 In other words, 
the higher the value of Gunder which ATT remains significantly different from zero, the 
more conclusive is the evidence that there exists a positive effect of program enrollment 
on farmer adoption decisions. Note that the test does not determine whether or not 
hidden bias exists, but rather, how sensitive the estimate would be to hidden bias if such 
an unobserved confounder existed (Rosenbaum 2002).  
In Table 10 we provide the results of the sensitivity analysis for all practices. The 
first column provides the G values and the second column (sig+) provides the 
corresponding upper bound on the p-value for the ATT. The results suggest that 
robustness to hidden bias varies considerably across the different practices. For 
conservation tillage, the results suggest that if an unobserved covariate caused the odds 
ratio to differ by a factor of around 1.3, then the ATT would no longer be significant at 
the 95% confidence level. For filter strips, however, the ATT remains significant up to a 
factor of 12, implying that the additionality estimate for filter strips is quite robust to 
unobserved bias. Gvalues for the remaining practices range from around 2.2 to 4.2, 
which suggests that all practices, except for conservation tillage, show moderate to high 
levels of robustness to unobserved bias. This implies that we can conclude with greater 
confidence that for most practices, program enrollment has a statistically significant 
effect on conservation effort. This suggests that hidden bias alone cannot explain the 
association between enrollment and conservation effort. 
                                                 
11 Studies by DiPrete and Gangl (2004), Andam et al. (2008), Ferraro et al. (2007), and Liu and Lynch 
(2011) consider G values greater than around 1.75 (for a 95% confidence level) imply the ATT estimates 
are at least moderately robust to hidden bias.   43
 
TABLE A.2 
Results for Rosenbaum Sensitivity Analysis 
Conservation Tillage  Cover Crops  Hayfields  Grid Sampling 
  sig+ 
 
sig+ 
  sig+ 
  sig+ 
1  0.003  1  0.001  1.8  0.004  2.2  0.004 
1.05  0.006  1.2  0.002  2.2  0.008  2.4  0.007 
1.1  0.009  1.4  0.006  2.6  0.013  2.6  0.011 
1.15  0.015  1.6  0.012  3  0.020  2.8  0.018 
1.2  0.022  1.8  0.020  3.4  0.028  3  0.026 
1.25  0.032  2  0.030  3.8  0.036  3.2  0.036 
1.3  0.045  2.2  0.043  4.2  0.044  3.4  0.048 
1.35  0.060  2.4  0.058  4.6  0.052  3.6  0.062 
 
Grass Waterways  Filter Strips 
  sig+ 
  sig+ 
2  0.000  6  0.002 
2.2  0.001  7  0.005 
2.4  0.002  8  0.010 
2.6  0.005  9  0.017 
2.8  0.012  10  0.025 
3  0.024  11  0.036 
3.2  0.044  12  0.048 
3.4  0.071  13  0.061 
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